In this paper, we provide new proofs of existence and uniqueness of a Stackelberg market equilibrium for a multiple leader-follower noncooperative oligopoly model in which heterogeneous …rms compete on quantities. To this end, we consider a two-step game of perfect and complete information in which many leaders interact strategically with many followers. The Stackelberg market equilibrium constitutes a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. The existence (and uniqueness) problem is complexi…ed in this framework since strategic interactions occur within each partial game but also between both partial games through sequential decisions. Then, to prove existence, we notably provide a new procedure to determine (the conditions under which) the optimal behavior of the followers (may be written) as functions of the leaders'strategy pro…le only. Some examples outline our procedure and discuss our assumptions.
INTRODUCTION
Stackelberg competition (1934) portrays a model of a market economy in which strategic …rms move sequentially and compete on quantities. In the basic duopoly model one …rm (the leader) moves …rst and makes her decision by taking into consideration the reaction of the other …rm (the follower). The leader perfectly knows her rival best response function. The follower can set his own supply according to any possible function of the quantity set by the leader, with the belief that the leader will not counter-react. Similarly, the leader expects the follower to conform to the decisions given by his best response function. A Stackelberg equilibrium (SE thereafter) is a noncooperative equilibrium of a two-step game with perfect and complete information where the players are the …rms, the strategies are their production decisions, and their payo¤s are their pro…t functions. A SE constitutes a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). Existence and uniqueness of SE are studied by Robson (1990) in the T -stage model of Boyer and Moreaux (1986) , with one monopoly …rm per stage. Alj et al. (1988) and Freiling et al. (2001) show existence in di¤erential duopoly games. The common feature of these models is the leader behaves as a monopolist by using the well-de…ned follower's best response. But the existence (and uniqueness) problem is complexi…ed with multiple leaders and followers as strategic interactions also occur within step of the game. As a consequence, in the presence of heterogeneous followers, the best responses could not be well-de…ned. This problem is the starting point of this paper.
1 This paper deals with the existence and uniqueness of a SE in a multiple leaderfollower model. To this end, we consider an extension of the two-stage deterministic and static noncooperative multiple leader-follower oligopoly model introduced by Sherali (1984) . There are several leaders and followers who compete on quantities to sell one homogeneous divisible product. This hierarchical model consists of two Cournot competitions encompassed by a Stackelberg competition. This model is thus described by a two-step game which embodies two simultaneous move partial games. Indeed, the leaders play a two-step game with the followers, but the leaders (the followers) play together a simultaneous move game. We assume the timing of positions is given. Information is assumed to be perfect and complete. Thus, we look for pure strategy SPNE. In addition, we focus on the case where pure strategies are substitutes. Existence and uniqueness problems are complexi…ed in this framework since strategic interactions occur within each partial game but also between both partial games through sequential decisions. One di¢ culty stems from the fact that any leader faces many followers optimal decision mappings. In a decentralized economy …rms determine their optimal decisions without central coordination device: each individual …rm acts independently and without communication with any of the others (see notably Johansen (1982) and Daughety (2009) ). Therefore, the resulting followers' (leaders') optimal decision mappings might be mutually inconsistent. More speci…cally, the followers' optimal decisions must be internally consistent to solve the game. Under this consistency requirement, the set of optimal decision mappings of followers can determine the best responses as functions of the strategies of leaders only. This problem is eluded in the literature and deserves more careful study. One novelty of our paper is that we provide a simple consistency criterion which determines the conditions under which such best response functions may be obtained. Our criterion also creates a logical link between the two partial games to study existence and uniqueness issues. Indeed, our existence and uniqueness proofs stem from a consistency (su¢ cient) condition among followers'decision mappings, each function being based on decentralized optimizing behavior.
Existence and uniqueness have already been explored in the multiple leaderfollower model. Sherali (1984) shows existence and uniqueness with identical convex costs for leaders, and states some results under the assumptions of linear demand either with linear or quadratic costs (see also Ehrenmann (2004) ). Sherali's model constitutes an extension of the seminal paper of Murphy et al. (1983) which covers the case of many followers who interact with one leader. In their model the authors provide a characterization of the SE and an algorithm to compute it. They state a Theorem 1 which gives the properties of the aggregate best response of the followers as a function of the leader's strategy. This determination stems from a family of optimization programs for the followers conceived as a price function perturbed by the supply of the leader. They show this aggregate function is convex, and then, study the leader's problem. But they do not study the conditions under which the followers' optimal decisions are mutually consistent. In the same vein, Tobin (1992) provides an e¢ cient algorithm to …nd a unique SE by parameterizing the price function by the leader's strategy. Some strong assumptions on the thricedi¤erentiability of the price function and cost function of the leader pro…t function are made. Following De Wolf and Smeers (1997) who extend Murphy et al. (1983) , De Miguel and Xu (2009) extend (1984) to uncertainty with stochastic market demand. Unlike Sherali (1984) they allow costs to di¤er across leaders. Nevertheless, to show the concavity of the expected pro…t of any leader, they assume that the follower aggregate best response is convex. But as this assumption does not always hold, they must resort to a linear demand. Fukushima and Pang (2005) , Yu and Wang (2008) , and He et al. (2015) prove existence of an equilibrium point of a …nite game with two leaders and several followers without specifying the assumptions made on demand and costs. In this paper, we consider a simple deterministic version of the hierarchical model without strategic complementarities.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, existence and uniqueness of a SE are obtained under weaker assumptions on cost and demand functions. The demand function is not speci…c and …rms may not bear the same costs. In addition, by contrast with Sherali (1984) , Ehrenmann (2004) and De Miguel and Xu (2009), some …rms (not all) may have nonconvex costs. Second, we provide a new procedure to characterize a SE, and thereby to prove its existence and its uniqueness. A SE is the outcome of a decentralized mechanism through which seperate rational …rms interact strategically. Indeed, our model is made up of two partial games encompassed by an entire game. Within each partial game the behavior of any leader (follower) is based on a separate maximization program. Therefore, the compatibility among individual decisions should be satis…ed within each step, but also between both steps of the game. The link between the two partial games is studied through a system of equations which speci…es a mutual consistency condition which is critical to derive followers' best responses. To this end, we provide a criterion to obtain the best responses from which we derive the e¤ective demand which addresses to any leader. This criterion works under some regularity conditions linked to di¤erentiability.
Within this framework we obtain the following results. First, we determine the optimal decision of any follower as a function of the strategy pro…les of the other followers and of the leaders. We show such functions are decreasing, with bounded partial derivatives. Then, we consider the existence of the best response functions of followers. To this end, we give a criterion to test the consistency of the system of equations which allows the determination of best responses. Hence, if the Jacobian matrix of followers best responses is of full rank, then, each follower's best response may be written as a function of leaders' strategy pro…le. Then, we consider any leader's problem when she faces the e¤ective demand, that is, the price as a function of leaders' strategy pro…le only. We also study the optimal decisions of leaders. Third, we consider the entire game and show existence and uniqueness of an active SE, i.e., an equilibrium with strictly positive strategies. Existence is shown by using some …xed point argument. Uniqueness is obtained by using some mild assumptions on costs and demand functions. The advantages of our approach are threefold. First, we provide a characterization of the strategic equilibrium which brings into light a consistency criterion. The possibility to solve the game depends on whether our criterion is satis…ed. If the criterion holds, our …nite extensive form game of perfect information may have a unique pure strategy SPNE. Second, we make some general assumptions on costs and demand functions. Third, our procedure puts forward the beliefs of leaders: by construction of a SE they know the reactions of the followers through the slope of the aggregate best response. Indeed, any leaders'markup and Lerner index, derived from the optimality conditions, are expressed in terms of this slope. Thus, the behavior of leaders deserve also to be analyzed in detail.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model. Section 3 is devoted to a de…nition of the SE which relates to rational behavior and to our consistency criterion. Existence and uniqueness are studied in Section 4. Section 5 provides some examples to discuss our assumptions and to illustrate our criterion. In section 6 we conclude. 
THE MODEL
The model is described in three steps. First, we set up the framework and …x some notations. Second, we give two assumptions and we discuss each of them. Third, we complete the description of the model with the associated game.
Framework and notations
Consider an oligopoly market with a single divisible homogeneous product. There is a …nite set of …rms F which embodies two types of …rms labeled F and L. Thus, the set F partitions into two subsets F L = f1; :::; n L g and F F = f1; :::; n F g,
. We consider jF L j > 1 and jF F j > 1, where jAj denotes the cardinality of the set A. Firms of type L are leaders, while …rms of type F are followers. Leaders are indexed by i and followers are indexed by j.
We adopt the following notational conventions. Let x 2 R n + . Then, x 0 means x i > 0, i = 1; :::; n; x > 0 means there is some i such that x i > 0, with x 6 = 0, and x >> 0 means x i > 0 for all i, i = 1; :::; n. Let x L = (x 
The partial derivative of f with respect to z i will be denoted by i .
Let jJ F ( z)j be the determinant of J F at z. Finally, when the distinction matters, if we partition z in such a way z = (x; y), then J Fx ( z) is the Jacobian matrix of F(z) at z when the di¤erentiation is partial and made with respect to x only. The corresponding determinant is denoted by jJ Fx ( z)j.
Assumptions: statement and discussion
We now make some assumptions regarding the demand side and the supply side of the market. There is a continuous market demand function D(p) which balances the aggregate supply X, with X X L + X F . It represents the maximum price the consumers are willing to pay to buy the quantity X as well the minimum price the …rms are willing to charge to sell the corresponding production X. Indeed, let X 7 ! p(X) = D 1 (X) be the market inverse demand function. We make the following set of assumptions regarding p(X), which we designate as Assumption 1. (1b) dp(X)
(dX) 2 6 0, where k > 0.
(1a) says that the inverse demand function p(X) is positively valued, and it may or may not intersect both the quantity axis and the price axis. We do not preclude that the price function intersects only one of the two axis. For instance, if
, with X = 1. If it would intersect only the price axis since we had lim X!0 p(X) = p > 0 (for instance:
). Therefore, (1a) does not impose too stringent property on the market demand function: it may be strictly concave (convex) or linear, without imposing some boundary conditions. (1a) also says that p(X) is well-behaved: it is twice continuously di¤erentiable on the open set R ++ . This assumption will be useful notably to characterize the optimal behavior in a Stackelberg market in Section 3.
(1b) is obvious. (1c) stipulates that marginal revenue for any single …rm is a decreasing function of total industry output. This formulation deserves two comments. First, we do not impose
(dX) 2 6 0, so we do not preclude (strictly) convex market demand functions. Second, our formulation of the decreasing marginal revenue hypothesis embodies the parameter k. For any follower …rm, we have k = 1, as in the Cournot model (Hahn (1962) , Okugushi (1976)). However, for any leader …rm k may be generally di¤erent from unity unless leaders behave as followers (see Section 3). Our formulation puts forward an important feature of Stackelberg competition which explicitly takes into account leader …rms have perfect information regarding the optimal reactions of followers to change in their strategies (Julien (2011) ).
Each …rm bears some costs. Cost functions satisfy the following set of assumptions, which we designate by Assumption 2.
Assumption 2. The cost function c
h (x h ), h 2 F, satis…es the following:
, and there exists X > 0 large enough for (2b) requires that the marginal cost rises faster than the decrease in the average revenue (the price). Let us notice costs may be di¤erent and need not be convex for all …rms, but it precludes concave costs for all …rms. In the presence of increasing returns, …rms should supply nothing. For instance, if jF F j = jF L j = 1, with p(X) = 4 X , and c F (x F ) = ln(1+x F ) and c L (x L ) = 2 p x L , then the market outcome is the trivial solution, i.e., x L = x F = 0. Hence, market outcomes with positive supplies require smooth costs. This condition is not stated exactly in the same way for leaders and for followers since leaders know the reactions of followers.
(2c) stipulates two things. First, the maximum price exceeds the higher marginal costs. It is assumed in all models; in particular the standard linear model with linear demand p(X) = a bX and constant marginal costs c 1 and c 2 , with c 1 > c 2 , considers a > c 1 . Second, industry supply is bounded if there is some large output level for which marginal costs exceeds any …rm's revenue, leading to negative marginal pro…ts. Hence, to prevent high production supply, we assume no …rm wishes to produce such a large quantity. Therefore, there is an upper bound on the production set, which compacti…es the set of possible supply (see Murphy et al. (1983) ). Thus, (2c) is a weakening of the usual assumption made on inverse market demand; we do not assume there is some …nite large quantity X < 1 for which p(X) = 0, for all X > X (Frank and Quandt (1963), Novshek (1985) ).
The pro…t functions i L (:) of …rm i and j F (:) of …rm j may be written: Proof. Di¤erentiating partially twice (2) with respect to x j F , and using (1c) and (2b) with k = 1, we deduce
A rather more complicated expression than the preceding one holds for any leader (see Section 4, Remark 2).
The Stackelberg game
To this economy we associate a game . The players are the …rms, the strategies are the production decisions, and the payo¤s are the pro…ts. Let
The corresponding payo¤s are given by i L , i 2 F L , and j F , j 2 F F . This game displays two stages of decisions and no discounting. We also assume the timing of positions as given. Thus, this hierarchical model consists of two Cournot competitions encompassed by a Stackelberg competition. Indeed, the n L leaders play a two-step game with the n F followers, but the leaders (the followers) play a simultaneous moves game. Finally, information is assumed to be complete and perfect. It notably implies that any leader perfectly knows the followers'behavior. Any leader is able to perceive the reactions of any follower. Perfect information also implies that, for any follower, each information set is a single decision node. In addition, in each decision node, any follower makes an optimal choice, so sequential rationality prevails. As sequential rationality is common knowledge, the game is solved by backward induction, considering …rst the optimal strategic decisions of the followers, and then the optimal strategic choices of the leaders.
OPTIMAL BEHAVIOR
In contrast with the duopoly game the behavior of …rms are complexi…ed in this model. First, given a feasible strategy pro…le for the leaders x L , each follower will determine her optimal decision as a mapping whose arguments are the strategies of all other followers and the strategies of all leaders. But the followers optimal decisions must be consistent. This consistency means that each optimal decision mapping may be reduced to a best response function of the leaders's strategies only. The following subsections provide three Lemmas. Lemmas 1 and 3 characterize followers and leaders behavior respectively, while Lemma 2 provides a consistency condition to determine the e¤ective demand which addresses to any leader. (by Proposition 1), subject to x j F 2 [0; X ], a nonempty and compact (convex) set (by (2c)). As the pro…t function is strictly concave it is continuous. Then, from the Weierstrass Theorem, the set arg max
The followers
In addition, from Proposition 1, we deduce
We now characterize follower j's optimal behavior. Let L be the Lagrangian and j and
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions may be written:
where
vector function de…ned by = ( 1 ; :::; j ; :::; n F ). Consider the Jacobian matri- 
, where 0 and I are the zero matrix and the unit matrix respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 notably states that each follower's optimal decision function is decreasing in the strategy of each other follower and in the strategy of each leader.
The best responses: a consistency criterion
Each leader has perfect information on the optimal decisions. But before considering the problem of any leader we must check that the system of optimal decisions is internally consistent: each follower's optimal decision mapping may be expressed as a function of the leaders's strategies only. To this end, we provide a consistency criterion which determines each optimal decision as a function of the strategy pro…le of the leaders. Indeed, any leader …rm is then able to solve the system of optimal decision mappings to obtain the best responses as functions of his own strategy and of the other leaders'strategies. It leads to the e¤ective demand (the price function as a mapping of the leaders'strategic supplies only) which addresses to any leader. Otherwise, if the criterion is not satis…ed, we cannot determine the individual best responses. Example 3 in Section 5 illustrates this fact.
Let the system of n F simultaneous equations with n F unknowns x j F and n L parameters be given by:
These n F equations taken together consist in a system of equations, whose solution, if it exists, provides best responses.
, be the best response of follower j, j 2 F F .
To introduce our criterion de…ne the function
the n F dimensional vector function de…ned by = 1 ; :::; j ; :::;
be the (n F ; n F ) square matrix formed by all partial derivatives of j with respect to x F at a point ( x F ; x L ). The next lemma provides a su¢ cient condition for the existence (and continuous di¤erentiability) of such best responses. So, Lemma 2 provides a criterion to determine locally the best responses.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The leaders
In the second step each leader knows how the market price is a¤ected by the followers'reactions. This information is transmitted through the e¤ective demand which adresses to her, i.e., p( 
, a nonempty and compact (convex) set. Moreover, from Lemma 2, the e¤ective demand p(
We now characterize leader i's optimal behavior. Let L be the Lagrangian and i and i the Lagrange multipliers. The problem of leader i 2 F L may be written:
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The term
, with i 2 [ 1; 0], represents the reaction of all followers to leader i's strategy, i.e., the slope of the aggregate best response to i, i 2 F L . By construction
with respect to x i L leads to:
We now check that
The expression given by (9) may be written
2 dp(X) dX and substracting (1 + ) dp(X) dX . As the …rst term is non positive, and the second term is strictly negative under (2b), and since 2 [ 1; 0], then we have
X , where
is the Lerner index, the price elasticity of demand, and
she behaves as a price taker (resp. an oligopolist). As i 2 [0; 1), we have > 1.
Remark 3. Let us notice that k = (1 + ) in (1c), so using (8), we have:
The expression given in (10) echoes Remark 1. 
Proof. The Jacobian matrix J ( x L ) is bounded. Di¤erentiating partially the identity
, and using (10), we get
. From (1b) and (2b), and as for each
SE: EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS
We now turn to the existence and uniqueness of a SE. Before we provide a de…nition of a SE for the game =
A SE is a noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium of a two-step game of perfect information such that, on the one hand, the market clears, and on the other hand, in each step of the game, no …rm has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its choice. Therefore, we must …rst consider the mutual consistency of the optimal behavior. Then, we turn to the study of uniqueness.
Existence
The hierarchical model of Sections 2 and 3 consists of two Cournot competitions encompassed by a Stackelberg competition. Indeed, the n L leaders play a twostep game with the n F followers, but the leaders (the followers) play together a simultaneous move game. Stackelberg competition is thus described by a two-step game which embodies two simultaneous move games. Therefore, this hierarchical game displays two partial games, namely F and L . The equilibrium of the entire game is a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), while the equilibria in each partial game are Nash equilibria. Therefore, we must show that there exists a pure strategy SPNE of . But such a SPNE exists for the entire game if it is a Nash equilibrium of each subgame of (Selten (1975) ). In addition, we must check that the …xed point is an active equilibrium, i.e., the StackelbergNash equilibrium strategy pro…le contains strictly positive components. Remark 4 outlines this point.
Remark 4. (Trivial equilibrium)
. Let us notice that the existence of interior solutions to programs (3) and (6), whose solutions may be well de…ned optimal decisions, does not ensure that the SE is not a trivial equilibrium. A trivial equilibrium is given by a strategy pro…le (
For instance, assume jF F j = jF L j = 1, with p(X) = 1 X , and c F (x F ) = 1 2 x F and c L (x L ) = 0. Then, the follower's best response is well de…ned and given
But the equilibrium strategy pro…le is (x L ;x F ) = (0; 0), the trivial solution (note the pro…t functions are strictly concave).
We are now able to state the following Theorem.
Theorem 1. (Existence). Consider the game
and let Assumptions 1 and 2 be satis…ed. Then, there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium which is an active equilibrium.
Proof. The strategy of the proof is as follows. First, we show there exists a strategy pro…le (
F such that the leaders and followers strategic optimal plans determined in Section 3 are mutually consistent. Second, we show that there may exist the strategy pro…le (x L ;x F ) is such that (x L ;x F ) >> (0; 0).
1. Consistency of optimal plans. The game is a two-step game which embodies two simultaneous move games. Let L and F be the simultaneous move partial games between leaders and between followers respectively. Therefore, we must show that the set of optimal decision functions for each partial game has a …xed point, which also constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the entire game.
We …rst show there is a …xed point to the system of leader's optimal decision mappings. From Lemmas 1-3, we can de…ne
L , a compact and convex subset of Euclidean space (as the product of compact and convex sets S
This …xed point constitutes a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of L .
We now show there is a …xed point to the system of followers optimal decision mappings. Using Lemma 1, we can de…ne F :
j . A similar argument as the one made for the leaders shows that the function
This …xed point is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of F . Now we must show that there is a Nash equilibrium for the entire game . From Lemma 2, we can de…ne
L is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of L , then, by using Lemma 2, we havex
, which constitutes a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of F . We conclude there exists a strategy pro…le
, which constitutes a SPNE of .
Then, fromX we deducep(X), withX
j (x L ;x F ), j 2 F F , follow from (1) and (2). 2. Equilibrium strategy pro…les. The equilibrium strategy pro…le may be the trivial one, in which case (x L ;x F ) = (0; 0), or interior, i.e., (x L ;x F ) >> (0; 0), 
There are two cases to deal with: either the inverse demand function intersects the axes or it does not.
Assume …rst the inverse demand function p(X) intersects the quantity axis. In such a case, p(X) may be either (strictly) concave or (strictly) convex. Therefore, there is X < 1 such that p(X) > 0 for X < X, and p( X) = 0 for X > X. Therefore, there is some …nite quantity demanded when the commodity is a free good. Select one
The same argument holds for all i 2 F L , and for all j 2 F F .
Existence of lower bound :
The proof holds either when lim X!0 p(X) = p, with 0 < p < 1, or when lim (9), we deduce i > 0, so the …rst-order condition is given by p(X)
. Therefore, the e¤ective demand which addresses to any leader
As from (1b), we have dp(X)
(0), a contradiction, as (2c) must hold. In consequence, if the residual demand which addresses to any follower j 2 F F is p(0+X F ), then, from (4) and Lemma 2, we deduce p(X F )+x j F dp dX (X F )
A contradiction. Then, we conclude that there must exist some …rm i 2 F L for which x i L > 0, and some …rm j 2 F F for which x j F > 0. Thus, the second part of the proof of Theorem 2 reveals that there is always a more pro…table strategic supply than the inactive one.
Uniqueness
Uniqueness is not guaranteed since we should have a con…guration in which the best responses are uniquelly determined but there could exist multiple equilibrium leaders'strategy pro…les (see Example 4 in Section 5).
Nevertheless, we are able to state the following Theorem. 
, is one to one. Then, uniqueness of the SNPE for (and then uniqueness of SE) is obtained through Lemma 2.
13
To this end, consider the gradient
Then, consider the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of L at (x L ;x F ), which we denote by jJ L (x L ;x F )j. It is well known that if the determinant at an active Cournot equilibrium is positive, then the equilibrium is unique (see Corollary 2.1 in Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987) ). As leaders in the partial game L behave as Cournot …rms, we show this criterion is satis…ed, so the pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the partial game L is unique. Then, using Lemma 2, we deduce there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of F .
Select one strategy pro…le (
and where
are given by (9) and (10) respectively.
If (1a) and (2a) are satis…ed, then, by substracting columm 1 to the other columns and expanding by co-factors, we deduce:
k dp(X) dX . (11) Assuming (2b), we deduce:
From (1c) and (2b), we deduce jJ L ((x L ;x F )j > 0. Then, there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the partial game L . Now setx L >> 0. From Lemma 2, we deducex F = '(x L ), which constitutes a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of F . Then, we conclude the pure strategy SPNE in is unique, which proves uniqueness of the SE.
Assuming symmetry among leaders, the condition for the sign of jJ L ((x L ;x F )j might be rewritten as
, which would say that "on average" leaders' marginal revenues could be increased but not too much (see Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987) for the Cournot market).
In addition, we can check that, under (2b), we would have had
L dominates the sum of the cross e¤ects of similar changes of other leaders'supply.
Let us notice that strategic complementarities are not precluded here, but they are not su¢ ciently strong to compensate strategic substituabilities. Therefore, our result transposes in a Stackelberg framework a result which holds in the Cournot market (see notably Vives (1999)).
DISCUSSION: SOME EXAMPLES
In order to discuss Theorems 1 and 2 and to illustrate our consistency criterion (Lemma 2), we provide four examples. We put forward the decreasing marginal revenue assumption which leads to consider the behavior of the price function on the boundary (hypothesis (2a)). We know that this condition may not be written in the same way for the leaders and for the followers (see Remarks 1 and 3). We also put forward the possibility of marginal costs to decrease more than the price function, letting the possibility of increasing returns (hypothesis (2b)). Example 1 outlines the procedure to compute a SE when Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Example 2 shows that even if Assumption 1 is not satis…ed, a unique SE may exist. Example 3 illustrates existence failure, a case for which our criterion is not satis…ed. Example 4 provides a case with multiple equilibria. These examples illustrate that our criterion constitutes a su¢ cient test condition for the existence of best responses. They also put forward that condition (12) is only su¢ cient for uniqueness of SE. We assume jF F j = jF L j = 2. To save notations, we sometimes let
Existence and uniqueness with Assumptions 1 and 2
Let the inverse market demand function be given by:
The cost functions are The followers's optimal decisions corresponding to (4) are given by:
2
Using (5), we get
2, leads to:
As
6 > 0, we can determine the best responses:
Let us notice
, which may be obtained by applying Cramer's rule to (16) . In addition, we have = X F leads to (14)- (15) . In addition, Assumptions 1 and 2 are satis…ed for any leader: dp(X) dX
and for any follower:
The marginal revenue of any …rm decreases, which illustrates the fact that supplies are strategic substitutes between leaders and /or followers.
Finally, (12) 
> 0. So the SE is unique. We could also check that sign jJ F (x L ;x F )j = sign( 5 2 ) > 0.
Existence and uniqueness without Assumption 1
where lim X!0 p(X) = 1, lim X!1 p(X) = 0, dp(X) dX = X +1 and The optimal decisions corresponding to (4) are given by:
We deduce:
If = 2 there is no solution to
2 > 0, so leaders and followers 16 strategies are strategic complements. Using (22)- (23), leader i faces the e¤ective demand (
We check that (1b) neither holds for the leaders: dp(X) dX
nor for the followers:
Here marginal revenue increases; so existence of a SE is not inconsistent with strategic complementarities.
Finally, we have sign jJ L ((x L ;x F )j = sign 1 ( 1) 2 < 0: the SE is unique even if the su¢ cient condition for uniqueness is not satis…ed. In addition, sign jJ F ((x L ;x F )j = sign( 1) < 0: strategic complementarities are here not su¢ ciently strong to produce multiple equilibria.
Existence failure (without Assumption 2)
The price function is given by (13) 
2 , j = 1; 2, with Followers'optimal decisions are given by:
We remark that (2b) is not satis…ed since:
The nonexistence stems here from the presence of increasing returns to scale.
Nonuniqueness
The inverse market demand is given by:
Followers'optimal decisions are given by:
Using (5), we deduce:
We deduce '
There are two symmetric equilibria (x L ;x F ) = (0; 0); ( ) . In the former = 0, so we have:
= dp(X) dX , i = 1; 2 and dp(X) dX +x
while in the latter we get: dp(X) dX
= (1 + ) dp(X) dX , i = 1; 2 and dp(X) dX +x
Finally, we have sign J L (0; 0); ( The paper provides new proofs for the existence and uniqueness of SE in the multiple leader-follower model. Our noncooperative oligopoly model embodies two partial simultaneous move games with heterogeneous …rms. As a hierarchical model, it consists of two Cournot competitions encompassed by a Stackelberg competition. One salient feature is the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the entire game is also based on consistent optimal decisions of followers. Our Lemma 2 provides a criterion to test for the existence of best responses, and thereby for the existence of a SE. In addition, our model generalizes some models of the literature as it displays some heterogeneity among …rms which may have di¤erent costs, some of which may be nonconvex.
The main conclusions of the paper may be stated as follows. First, failure of existence stems from the fact that the system of equations that implicitly de…nes the best responses is inconsistent. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 the system is always consistent. Second, uniqueness is ensured since best responses are decreasing functions with negative slopes strictly greater than minus unity.
These results suggest three …nal comments. First, our model embodies two step of decisions and should be developed to embody a …nite number of steps larger than two. Second, we should consider the strategic complementarities at work when best responses are increasing. Third, since strategic complementarities a¤ect payo¤s, the endogeneization of the order of moves should be undertaken within this framework.
APPENDIX
The proofs bring into light the role played by Assumptions 1 and 2, and more speci…cally, which parts in the two Assumptions play a critical role.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
The Jacobian matrix
F ; x L ) 0 with respect to x j F , we get:
From (1b)-(1c) and (2b), we get 
consist of zeros and the o¤-diagonal terms are negative and above 1.
F ; x L ) 2 (0; X ), j 2 F F and write (4) as an identity:
L . Di¤erentiating partially with respect to x i L yields, after rearrangement:
This indentity is true only if
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 2
We show (5) has a solution, namely
we focus on inner solutions, consider the restriction of
, where
. Implicit partial di¤erentiation with respect to x L of this identity leads to:
where 
are matrices of dimension (n F ; n L ) respectively. We …rst show that J x F ( x F ; x L ) is a strictly positive square matrix. From (5), for each j 2 F F , we have
, where I is the identity matrix of dimension (n F ; n F ). So, the matrixJ x F ( x F ; x L ) has unit terms on the main diagonal and strictly positive (less than one) o¤-diagonal terms. We deduce J x F ( x F ; x L ) >> 0 (n F ;n F ) . But then, the matrix J x F ( x F ; x L ) has strictly positive real eigenvalues e j , j = 1; :::; n F . As the determinant is the product of such
Then, by the Implicit Function Theorem, there exist open sets U in Q
, there exists a locally unique n F dimensional vector function x F (x L ) in some neighborhood of (
, and is de…ned by ' :
In addition, the function '(x L ) is continuously di¤erentiable. Then, for each j 2 F F , ' j (x L ) is C 1 .
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3
We must show that for all i 2 F L , 1 < 
is the (n F ; n F ) square matrix obtained by replacing the jth column in J ( x F ; x L ) by the ith positive member of B, so that: 
We know J x F ( x F ; x L ) > 0, so we deduce:
By de…nition of p(X), for each j 2 F F , we know that 
We also know that J 
which leads to:
Expansion by cofactors of J
x L ) and cancellation among common terms on both sides lead to:
with x =( x F ; x L ), and where (J x F ) (n F 1;n F 1) ( x) (resp. (J 0 x F ) (n F 1;n F 1) ( x) ) stands for the principal minor of order (n F 1; n F 1) of J x F ( x) (resp. J 
